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ISLAMAPHOBIA, NEO-ORIENTALISM, AND THE SPECTER OF JIHAD: PROBLEMS 
FACING MUSLIM LITIGANTS IN U.S. COURTS 
AGATHA KOPROWSKI* 
INTRODUCTION 
Islam is one of the fastest growing religions in the United States.  Although estimates of 
the number of Muslims living in the United States vary, many scholars believe that Islam will 
soon surpass Judaism as the second largest religion in the country, if it has not already.1  Muslims 
have primarily immigrated to America from the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.  Groups of these 
immigrants started arriving in the United States as early as the 1870s, and the number of Muslim 
immigrants has increased significantly since 1960, when Congress adjusted immigration laws 
concerning national quotas.2  The significant proportion of African-Americans and native-born 
Muslims who are first-generation, second-generation, or third-generation Americans augment the 
American Muslim immigrant community. 
Muslims have long played an active role in Western imagination.  Since as early as the 
Crusades and the Moorish rule of Spain, Christian Europe has seen Muslims as foreign, exotic, 
and potentially dangerous to Christian society.  From Bernard Lewis’ work to Edward Said’s, 
there is no dearth of scholarship devoted to the perceived dichotomy of the Islamic East and the 
Judeo-Christian West.3  Muslims living in North America and Western Europe are, of course, not 
immune to such generalizations about their faith, which have affected the ways in which Muslim 
communities function in these countries and their relationships with their Christian, Jewish, or 
other compatriots.4 
Since the end of the Cold War, Islam has been increasingly seen as the “new enemy” (or 
the revived old enemy) of the West.5  Terrorist attacks, such as the 1993 bombing at the World 
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Trade Center, the attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and, in particular, the 
September 11, 2001 (“September 11”) attacks exacerbated these fears and brought the image of a 
radical Islam in opposition to American values to the national forefront.  Muslims, especially 
Arab Muslims, have been demonized through laws, foreign policy, and popular media.  As Susan 
Akram and Kevin Johnson point out, “[s]ince at least the 1970s, U.S. laws and policies have been 
founded on the assumption that Arab and Muslim noncitizens are potential terrorists and have 
targeted them for special treatment under the law.”6  This special treatment has fostered an 
environment in which Muslims, or those who are thought to be Muslims (like Sikhs), have 
become the targets for hate crimes and race-based discrimination.7  Furthermore, private 
harassment and discriminatory treatment against Muslims is on the rise.  The Council on 
American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), which helps Muslims manage civil rights complaints, has 
seen an increase in the number of complaints it receives every year since it began tracking them in 
1995.8  The increase has been dramatic, from eighty reported complaints in 1995-1996 to 2,652 in 
2007.9 
Judicial opinions concerning Muslim parties often rely on and reinforce popular 
stereotypes.  There may be ways in which this is unavoidable.  Lawyers must function in a world 
of concrete answers.  Opinions that contemplate nuanced understandings of complicated 
relationships, such as those between Muslims and Christians or among Muslims in various 
communities, would set precedents that might be difficult or impossible for subsequent courts to 
follow.  As anthropologist Anthony Good points out, “legal proceedings must produce definite 
outcomes . . . within quite short time spans.  Judges do not enjoy the same luxury as scholars of 
being able to refine their views on particular matters throughout lifetimes of research and 
scholarship, and existential doubt is incompatible with the need to decide there and then.”10  
Judges and advocates end up relying on a mix of expert opinion—as presented in court—and 
generalizations about foreign concepts.  This is often intensified by the legal fiction that juries can 
and should make their own conclusions about evidence without the aid of cultural 
contextualization.11  Nonetheless, the reinforcement of particularly negative generalizations about 
Muslim litigants is not inevitable.  Even if judges and advocates must present arguments 
pragmatically, one need not assume that the representations of Muslims and Islam need to take the 
form that they do in many court cases. 
Attorneys representing Muslim clients might find it useful to investigate the ways in 
which judicial language and legal action perpetuate negative stereotypes about Muslims.  A better 
understanding of how courts employ negative views about Islam could help lawyers advocating 
for Muslim clients frame their arguments in ways that seek to counteract, rather than reinforce, 
misperceptions about Islam and Muslims.  This article will consider post-September 11 court 
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cases in four areas of law—immigration, criminal, family, and civil rights—with the purpose of 
highlighting how the language of the courts sustains popular misconceptions about Islam and 
often negatively affects Muslims parties in U.S. courts. 
I. ISLAM AS INTOLERANT: OBSTACLES FACED BY ASYLUM SEEKERS 
In order to qualify for asylum under U.S. law, an applicant must show that he or she has 
a genuine fear of persecution based on his or her religious or political beliefs, race, national 
origin, or membership in a particular social group.12  In order to assert a successful affirmative 
claim for asylum, an applicant is first interviewed by an asylum officer, who is a federal 
employee.13  If the officer feels that the applicant has shown a genuine fear of persecution because 
of a particular belief or membership in a particular group, the applicant is granted asylum and 
receives legal residency status based on asylum.14  If the asylum officer feels that the applicant 
has not met the legal burden for asylum, the officer refers the applicant to an immigration judge, 
who schedules a hearing and comes to a conclusion based on the same criteria.15 
If the immigration judge is also not convinced, the applicant will usually be put into 
removal proceedings.16  The applicant can appeal the decision of the immigration judge to the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and further to a federal circuit court.17  This final step rarely 
occurs, but it is the only widely available source for asylee opinions.  The decisions of 
immigration courts and the BIA are rarely, if ever, published and are persuasive, but not binding, 
on other tribunals.  Moreover, by the time the decision reaches a federal circuit court (or even 
more extraordinarily the United States Supreme Court), the issues on appeal have been very 
narrowly tailored.  These court opinions do not examine every detail of the case, which may have 
been discussed at length at other points in the judicial process. 
Consequently, available opinions deciding many asylum claims from Muslims based on 
religious persecution often lack in-depth discussions of religious beliefs because the courts did not 
reach the merits due to procedural or other reasons.  Nevertheless, a survey of some recent asylum 
cases may help illuminate the ways in which U.S. immigration courts perpetuate a monolithic 
image of Islam that is generally fanatical, foreign, and intolerant, and simultaneously deny asylum 
seekers the opportunity to escape persecution associated with a government or a populace that 
adopts or tacitly accepts a violent interpretation of the Islamic faith. 
A. Ramadan v. Gonzales18 
Neama El Sayed Ramadan, an Egyptian native, sought asylum based on her non-
conformist Islamic beliefs, which, according to Ramadan, led to beatings by her male relatives, 
harassment from “other Islamic men,” and phone threats from Muslim groups while she was 
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living in Alexandria.19  Although she reported an incident to the local police, the police did not 
pursue an investigation.20  Ramadan testified that in 1999, a group of individuals threatened to 
kidnap her children because of the way that she talked and dressed.21  At this point, Ramadan 
decided to flee to the United States, where her other children were living, and to remain there.22  
She received a phone call from relatives in Egypt who had been threatened after Ramadan had 
had a conversation at a friend’s house in San Francisco about the role of women in Egypt.  In June 
2001, Ramadan applied for asylum. 23 
The court described Ramadan as dressing “in western attire, such as mini-skirts” and as 
someone who “believed ‘a woman should have her own opinion and should have her own way of 
living.’”24  Ramadan’s views and mode of dress are presented as non-conforming with Islamic 
custom.25  Islamic custom, the court’s opinion implies, is implicit in the behavior of the men who 
beat and harassed Ramadan and who believed that she should behave more like a “typical Muslim 
woman,” who, apparently, should not have her own opinion or own way of living.26  The court did 
not investigate Ramadan’s own religious beliefs and faith.  Ramadan never denies being Muslim, 
but the court seems to assume that a woman who does not wear the hijab27 and has adopted other 
Western ideas could not possibly be a true Muslim.  By presenting Ramadan’s views as non-
conformist, the court implies that there is one, true interpretation of Islam, a religion that is 
inherently violent and intolerant of alternate beliefs.  By not investigating her beliefs, the court 
paints a picture of Egypt in which the fanatical (Muslim) majority preys on the liberalized 
(Western) minority, corresponding with widespread generalizations and popular notions about 
Islamic fundamentalists. 
In spite of the court’s suggestion that Ramadan’s Egyptian harassers are religious 
fanatics and its de-emphasis of Ramadan’s own religious opinions, Ramadan’s asylum case was 
ultimately dismissed because she failed to submit her asylum application within one year of her 
arrival in the United States.  On appeal, she requested Withholding of Removal.28  The 
requirements for Withholding of Removal are essentially the same as those for asylum, except the 
applicant must show that there is a greater than fifty percent chance that she will face persecution 
if she returns to her home country (as opposed to an asylee, who only needs to show a significant, 
usually about one in ten, chance that he or she will face persecution).29  Again, the Ninth Circuit 
denied Ramadan’s Withholding of Removal request because the court did not feel that Ramadan 
met the burden of showing that she would “more likely than not” face persecution if returned to 
Egypt, irrespective of the evidence of threats, beatings, and harassment Ramadan presented at 
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trial.30 
B. Kane v. Gonzales31 
Like Ramadan, Nafissatou Kane sought asylum based on her status as a “westernized 
woman.”32  Kane’s fear of persecution was based on the persecution she had faced previously 
when she underwent female genital cutting as an infant in her native Mali.33  Although the 
immigration judge was convinced that Kane deserved asylum, the BIA overturned the lower 
court’s decision, claiming that Kane’s circumcision could not have been on account of her 
membership in the group of “westernized women” opposed to the practice, since she was only one 
or two weeks old at the time of the ceremony.34 
Also, like Ramadan, the court’s opinion evidently does not consider Kane Muslim.  The 
court describes her father, on the other hand, as a “religiously fanatical” Imam, who arranged her 
marriage at the age of eleven to a man three decades her senior.35  Although Kane eventually 
escaped her marriage and fled to Saudi Arabia, she often returned to Mali, where, according to the 
court, her community and family shunned her because of “her inability to accept the traditional, 
oppressed role of a Muslim woman in a Muslim society.”36  This statement suggests that a Muslim 
woman’s role in a Muslim society is unquestionably subjugated.  Women in Muslim society are 
oppressed because Islamic custom dictates it.  However, the court’s description is not accurate.  
Kane’s religious beliefs conflict with the allegedly radical Islam of her father, but that conflict 
does not make her beliefs any less Islamic.  The Third Circuit, like the Ninth in Ramadan’s case, 
sees Islam as inherently oppressive of women, rather than seeing the women’s subordination in 
Mali and elsewhere as the result of these societies’ patriarchal interpretations of religion, culture, 
and history.  Ironically, the court’s interpretation is not enough to constitute persecution in either 
Ramadan or Kane.  This interpretation separates Ramadan’s and Kane’s struggles from a religious 
conflict and casts Ramadan and Kane as the victims of a particular culture, increasing the 
difficulty of finding relief through the asylum process. 
A close reading of the two cases presents a picture of Islam that is inherently opposed to 
the liberal values that are treasured in America, specifically, and in the West, more generally.  If 
the courts’ interpretations are to be taken seriously, women in Islamic societies will, by definition, 
face oppression and live in subordinated positions to men.  “True” Muslims will be apt to react 
violently when the West threatens their values.  Ironically, although the courts have painted such 
a grim future for Ramadan and Kane, they, nevertheless, deny them relief. 
C. Mohammed v. Keisler37 
The interpretation of Islam as violent and monolithic is not limited to Islam’s treatment 
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of women.  A Shia Muslim from Pakistan, Aftab Mohammed, sought asylum based on his 
religious beliefs after a group of men at a Sunni mosque beat him.38  After the beating, the local 
police incarcerated Mohammed, and released him only after receiving a bribe, whereupon they 
confiscated his passport.39  The immigration judge and the Sixth Circuit on appeal weighed 
affidavits, which two experts wrote on Mohammed’s behalf and a report from the United 
Kingdom Home Office, which the government presented as evidence.40  The British report found 
that “Shias do not face systematic discrimination, are found at all levels of society, and have their 
own social, political, and cultural organizations.”41 
Although Mohammed had only been targeted and attacked at the mosque after he had 
been identified as Shia, the appellate court felt that since “Mohammed voluntarily walked into a 
Sunni mosque, it is impossible to say he was targeted for abuse.”42  The court also pointed to the 
conclusion in the U.K. report that “Shias are generally protected by the government.”43  It is not 
clear that the court had a solid understanding of the differences between Sunni and Shia Muslims, 
nor that it was interested in one.  The court initially accepted Mohammed’s testimony that he was 
beaten because he was Shia, then stated in its analysis that he could not have been targeted for his 
religious beliefs: “During a visit to his sister in Pakistan in 1992, [Mohammed] entered a Sunni 
Mosque, prayed there, and when recognized as a Shia, he was beaten and chased out of the 
mosque.”44  This conclusion is truly baffling.  The only way to really understand the court’s 
deduction is to assume that no real differences exist between Muslim groups in Pakistan (or 
perhaps in general) and that Mohammed must have personally riled the group of Sunnis as well as 
the local police.  The court’s lack of concern about the roots of the group’s violent behavior is not 
surprising if Islam itself is violent and its people irrational, as many Americans understand it to 
be. 
D. Akhtar v. Attorney General of the United States of America45 
Like Ramadan and Kane, Syed Atif Akhtar sought asylum in the United States from 
persecution based on his “liberal, pro-American” beliefs.46  Akhtar was from Pakistan and 
practiced a minority religion, Sufism, in a country he described as “increasingly fundamentalist 
and intolerant since the attacks of September 11, 2001.”47  Akhtar’s primary evidence consisted of 
threats made to him and his family members and several robberies of his parents’ house.  Akhtar 
also supported his claims with statements of various witnesses about general country conditions in 
Pakistan.48  However, the Third Circuit found this evidence unpersuasive. 
The court ignored any analysis of the differences or tensions between Sunni-Wahhabi 
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Muslims and Sufis in Pakistan.  Likening Akhtar’s case to a 2005 case concerning an ethnic 
Chinese Christian seeking asylum from Indonesia, the court suggested that general economic (or 
perhaps even ethnic) tensions, and not religious differences, led to the robberies.49  Therefore, the 
persecution that Akhtar suffered could not constitute persecution on account of his Sufi beliefs or 
practices.50  However, the court offered no discussion of what Akhtar’s religious differences 
might be or how those differences could be regarded as threatening to the Pakistani majority elite. 
Following the themes present in Ramadan and Kane, the courts seem to make the same 
assumption in both Akhtar’s and Mohammed’s cases.  There are no real differences between 
Muslim groups, so there must have been another reason (economic, ethnic) that led to the 
harassment of the two men.  The fear that all Muslims are potential terrorists is only possible in a 
world in which difference between Muslim ideas cannot exist.  If, by chance, a Muslim does 
disagree with the established version of Islam, the court represents him or her as westernized or 
pro-American.  The individual has ceased to be Muslim in the understanding of the socio-legal 
imagination. 
Through the decisions of these asylum courts, one may conclude that Islam is 
represented most accurately and most innately by the most repressive regimes.  Judges, who, after 
all, are not immune to social prejudices, reinforce widespread American stereotypes about 
Muslims.  By framing many claims in terms of membership in “pro-liberal” or “westernized” 
groups, advocates for asylum applicants do little to help dispel the same myths about Islam.  
Instead, they bolster Americans’ underlying fear about Muslims: “they” hate “us” because of our 
freedoms, because of our values, because “they” are primitive and bigoted and “we” are tolerant 
and enlightened. 
In her discussion of asylum and refugee claims that took place in the 1990s, Susan 
Akram refers to this phenomenon as “neo-Orientalism,” alluding to Edward Said’s seminal 
work.51  Akram explains how advocates perpetuate Western stereotypes about Muslim and Middle 
Eastern society, in particular, the belief that there “are still such things as an Islamic society, an 
Arab mind, an Oriental psyche.”52  Moreover, the identified “sources of persecution,” according 
to neo-Orientalist critics, are “Islamic law” and “Muslim mores.”53  Many of the themes that 
Akram identifies have continued in the asylum cases of the last decade.  Courts now cite the same 
cases she criticized, using the same interpretations of Muslim conditions she identified as 
problematic.54  While the events of September 11 do not seem to have worsened the stereotyping 
that courts employ, neither have those events diminished it.  The asylum system depends on 
extremely subjective judicial interpretations.  It seems that Muslims seeking relief based on their 
religious views will continue to encounter these generalizations, which distort the image of their 
home societies. 
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See, e.g., Yadegar-Sargis v. INS, 297 F.3d 596, 603 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d 
Cir. 1993) and Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636 (8th Cir. 1994), two of the cases Akram finds particularly problematic). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
ISLAMAPHOBIA FORMATTED 3_9_11.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/9/2011  6:25 PM 
190 UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE [Vol. 14 
II. DISTINGUISHING MUSLIM CRIMINALS FROM RADICAL TERRORISTS 
One of the most widely discussed topics in American media over the last decade is the 
link between radical Islam and terrorism.  Although many groups work tirelessly to expel the idea 
that all Muslims are terrorists, there is a general sense in American culture that so-called Islamic 
fundamentalists (or perhaps Islamo-fascists) are incessantly conspiring to harm “us.”  Criminal 
courts often must determine whether to admit evidence concerning radical Islam and its links to 
terrorism.  Courts seem to recognize the risk that defense lawyers could try to present a violent 
interpretation of Islam as a “cultural defense” against serious crimes.  This form of defense, which 
immigrant and ethnic minority defendants are using more frequently, posits that courts should 
apply leniency to defendants whose cultures do not recognize actions as crimes in the same 
manner as the adjudicating culture.55 
Cultural defense is controversial for many reasons.  Courts are concerned that criminals 
could be exculpated for crimes they intended to commit.  Others fear that proposing “culture” as 
an excuse, or at least a mitigating circumstance, might lead some to believe that certain criminal 
behavior is inevitable within individual cultural groups.56  Some judges are hesitant to admit any 
contextualization of a defendant’s culture to avoid risking the consequences of a cultural defense.  
However, the risk is equally great that without any context in which to understand a party’s 
motivations, juries will associate all Muslims who are indicted for crimes with radical Islamic 
terrorists, especially considering the popular propaganda against Muslims and general 
misunderstandings of Islam. 
A. United States v. Amawi57 
In the spring of 2008, Mohammed Zaki Amawi, Marwan El-Hindi, and Wassim 
Mazloum were put on trial for conspiring to kill United States service personnel in Iraq and 
providing material support for terrorism.58  During the trial, the defense proffered several expert 
witnesses whom they intended, inter alia, to explain to the jury the cultural context for the 
defendants’ beliefs and, in particular, the roots of the modern jihad movement.59  The United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio rejected the defense’s motion to include 
these testimonies and wrote an opinion explicating the decision of the court. 
The court first pointed out that the government had also proffered an expert witness, 
Evan Kohlmann, to speak about the defendants’ use of the internet, as well as international 
terrorist organizations’ use of the internet more generally.  The court first considered Kohlmann’s 
testimony too expansive and granted the defense’s motion to exclude the testimony.60  However, 
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See generally Good, supra note 10 (providing an in-depth analysis of the growing use of cultural defense, 
particularly in British courts). See also Kathleen M. Moore, Representation of Islam in the Language of Law: Some Recent 
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Kohlmann was later allowed to testify on a more limited list of topics.61 
The court was correct in recognizing that allowing Kohlmann’s testimony regarding 
terrorist and insurgent groups active in the Middle East, with whom the defendants had no 
interaction “would invariably suggest to the jury that somehow they did.”62  Nevertheless, the 
court did not specify in its opinion what precisely it would exclude from Kohlmann’s testimony to 
prevent this from happening in response to his more limited testimony. 
The first expert the defense proposed was Reza Aslan, a doctoral student at the 
University of California at Santa Barbara and an expert on the roots of jihad as a social 
movement.63  Aslan was to explain both the foundation of jihad as a “global social movement” 
and how intense engagement by the leaders of the movement transforms its members from “free 
riders” into “active participants.”64  The defense emphasized the importance of contextualizing the 
jihad movement for the jury and explaining the process through which one goes from expressing 
certain religious and political beliefs to advocating and participating in violent action.65  The 
defense did not intend to present this argument to justify criminal actions, as in a cultural defense, 
but to show that although the defendants may have expressed ideological beliefs similar to 
recognized terrorist groups, that expression did not necessarily mean that they intended to 
participate in violent actions against the American state or its people. 
The court, however, was not convinced.  Aslan’s testimony was considered too general 
to be included in the jury trial.66  Somehow, the trial judge concluded that a case in which the 
defendants were charged with providing material support to terrorism and conspiring to commit 
terrorist acts in Iraq “is not a case about Islam, jihadist movements or Terrorism.  This is a case 
about whether specific acts violated federal criminal laws.”67  Aslan’s testimony was subsequently 
excluded. 
The court argued that such contextualization for the jury would conflict with the efforts 
made during the jury selection process to ensure that the religious beliefs of either the defendants 
or of the jurors would not affect the jury’s deliberations.68  The court appears to be either ignorant 
of or apathetic to the negative stereotypes about Muslims that are prevalent in American society.  
Although Kohlmann’s testimony about the defendants’ allegedly illicit use of computer 
documents and internet websites was permissible, Aslan’s explanation of what these documents 
meant to the defendants, who also happen to be devout Muslims, was not. 
The second defense expert whose testimony the court excluded was Jon B. Alterman, the 
Director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.69  Like Aslan, 
Alterman intended to present a nuanced perspective of Middle Eastern attitudes about America 
and the meanings attached to those attitudes, like the function of jihadist videos downloaded from 
the web, for example.70  Again the court claimed that Alterman’s testimony would primarily 
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“confuse the issues.”71  To the court, the videos were self-explanatory.  The jury did not need to 
hear how the understanding of the confiscated videos might differ completely based on alternate 
religious or cultural backgrounds.  The court excluded all of the defense’s attempts to “demystify” 
their clients’ beliefs.72  The jury was left on its own to determine the meaning of the defendants’ 
statements and actions, which would certainly be subject to general American fears and distrust of 
Muslims. 
B. United States v. Benkahla73 
In 2003, Sabri Benkahla and ten other men associated with the Dar al-Arqam Islamic 
Center in Falls Church, VA were arrested and indicted for conspiracy and providing material 
support to terrorism.74  Benkahla was acquitted after a bench trial in 2004, but within a short 
period of time, he was subpoenaed and compelled to testify at several grand juries in exchange for 
immunity.75  During these testimonies, Benkahla was asked if he had attended “jihadist training 
camps” during a trip to Pakistan and Afghanistan in 1999.  Benkahla denied attending any camps, 
which was one of the accusations of which he had been acquitted during his previous criminal 
trial.76  In 2006, Benkahla was again indicted, this time for making false material declarations 
during his testimonies to the grand juries.77 
While trying Benkahla for perjury, the government presented expert testimony from 
Evan Kohlmann (by coincidence, the same expert the government used in Amawi) concerning 
background information about terrorism and violent jihad.78  After his conviction Benkahla 
appealed, claiming, inter alia, that Kohlmann’s testimony was unduly prejudicial and irrelevant.79  
Kohlmann’s testimony focused entirely on radical Islam and jihad in general, rather than on 
Benkahla specifically.80  Among other issues, Kohlmann iterated the notion that so-called radical 
Islamists hate us: “Kohlmann remarked that, for Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, ‘Americans, no 
matter where they are on earth, whether they’re civilian or military, are considered to be a target.  
There are no innocent civilians.’”81 
Despite the fact that Benkahla was not accused of committing terrorist acts, both the trial 
and appellate courts considered this background essential.  The Fourth Circuit, showing deference 
to the trial court, found that Kohlmann’s testimony assisted the jury in understanding the evidence 
from a “broader frame of reference.”82 
A side-by-side comparison of Bankahla’s and Amawi’s cases reveals a frightening 
approach to terrorist prosecutions.  While juries must rely on their own judgment when 
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interpreting evidence of an alleged terrorist plot, cultural evidence regarding the motivations of 
international radical Muslim terrorists is permissible against a defendant accused of lying under 
oath.  In other words, these two courts allowed expert testimony that confirmed already 
widespread fears about Islamic fanaticism in furtherance of the government’s prosecution.  
However, the court excluded testimony intended to challenge these stereotypes in support of the 
defense. 
III. FAMILY LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY: MAHR AND PROPERTY IN DIVORCE 
PROCEEDINGS 
The Islamic word mahr most closely translates into English as dowry or dower, although 
this translation is not entirely accurate.  In an Islamic marriage contract, mahr is a sum of money 
or other valuables that the husband owes his wife. 83  Without mahr, an Islamic marriage is not 
considered valid.  Usually, the husband immediately pays some of the mahr to the bride at the 
initiation of the contract.84  This initial payment can range from a token amount, such as one 
dollar or one piece of gold, to the total amount.  The rest of the mahr is “postponed” or 
“deferred.”  The balance is payable to the wife upon divorce or the death of her spouse.85  
Traditionally, Islamic law recognized the wife’s right to the mahr regardless of the circumstances 
prompting the divorce, unless the marriage had not been consummated.  Even in this case, the 
husband may have been required to pay half the mahr to the wife.86 
American courts have not reached a consensus on whether or not (and under which 
circumstances) to enforce a mahr agreement.  Muslim couples seem to increasingly access the 
courts in order to enforce their Islamic marriage contracts, and there is no shortage of recent cases 
dealing with the mahr in the context of divorce.87  When confronted with these cases, courts often 
make broad assumptions about the nature of the mahr and its purpose in an Islamic context.  
These assumptions again perpetuate stereotypes about Muslims in general, especially those from 
the Middle East and South Asia. 
A. Zawahiri v. Alwattar88 
Mohammed Zawahiri filed for divorce from his wife, Raghad Zahar Alwattar, in 
February 2007 after only a year of marriage.89  During the divorce trial, the couple testified that 
Zawahiri had approached Alwattar’s mother in January 2006, expressing his desire to marry her 
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daughter.  The wedding took place one month later.90  The couple had an Islamic marriage 
ceremony overseen by an imam.91  Shortly before the ceremony began, the couple completed a 
marriage contract that the imam presented to them.92 The pre-printed form contained a blank 
space on which to write the amount of the mahr.  The groom and the bride’s father began 
negotiating the mahr amount, which they had not previously discussed.93  They eventually 
decided that the advanced portion of the mahr would be a ring and some gold that Zawahiri had 
already given Alwattar and the balance would be $25,000.94  All parties agreed to the terms and 
signed the contract. 
Both the trial court and the appellate court found the mahr unenforceable as a pre-nuptial 
agreement.  According to the Ohio Court of Appeals, in order to enforce a contract as a prenuptial 
agreement, the contract must satisfy three criteria: “(1) the parties entered into it freely without 
fraud, duress, coercion, or overreaching; (2) there was full disclosure, or full knowledge and 
understanding of the nature, value, and extent of the prospective spouse’s property; and (3) the 
terms do not promote or encourage divorce or profiteering by divorce.”95 
The court found that the couple’s mahr agreement failed to satisfy the first requirement.  
Zawahiri testified that he felt “embarrassed and stressed” during the mahr negotiations, which 
took place immediately before the ceremony.96  The court presumed coercion merely because the 
groom and his father-in-law had not previously discussed the mahr amount.97  The court did not 
try to investigate how mahr contracts are usually made, or when parties generally agree upon the 
mahr amount.  The court never asked Zawahiri if he knew that he would have to agree to a mahr 
before entering a Muslim marriage or if he had considered an amount before he arrived for the 
ceremony.  The court presented the mahr quite like a dowry.  The court subtly suggested that a 
mahr is an archaic and outdated concept, using the term interchangeably with dowry and making 
no attempt to understand the purpose of the mahr.98  By determining that the mahr agreement was 
too rushed to be enforceable, the court suggested that Zawahiri was blindsided by his wife-to-be’s 
sudden demand for a mahr.  Given the prevalence of mahr in Islamic marriages and Zawahiri’s 
professed devotion to his religion, it is difficult to see how this could be the case. 
The court found another reason to refuse to enforce the contract.  Zawahiri argued, and 
the court accepted, that enforcing the mahr would violate the Establishment Clause of the Ohio 
Constitution.99 Zawahiri suggested that the Ohio court would be “establishing” Islam as a state 
religion if it forced him to pay the mahr amount to which he had contracted.  There is no real 
reason to believe that this is the case. Other courts have approached the establishment question in 
the same context and reached the opposite conclusion.  Courts enforce contracts of all kinds, so 
long as the parties acted freely and their offer and acceptance of the contract was valid. The New 
Jersey Superior Court in 2002 asked, “Why should a contract for the promise to pay money be 
                                                                 
90
Id. 
91
Id. 
92
Id. 
93
Zawahiri, 2008 WL 2698679, at *1. 
94
Id. 
95
Id. at *4 (quoting Gross v. Gross, 11 Ohio St.3d 99, 99 (Ohio 1984)). 
96
Id. at *6. 
97
Id. 
98
Id at *7. 
99
Zawahiri, 2008 WL 2698679, at *7. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol14/iss1/5
ISLAMAPHOBIA FORMATTED 3_9_11.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/9/2011  6:25 PM 
2011] ISLAMAPHOBIA, NEO-ORIENTALISM, AND THE SPECTER OF JIHAD 195 
less of a contract just because it was entered into at the time of an Islamic marriage ceremony?”100 
There is nothing inherently “religious” about Zawahiri and Alwattar’s mahr agreement.  
It does not try to force either party to conform to Islamic standards or perform Muslim rituals.  
The mahr simply guarantees a pension to Alwattar in the event of divorce or her husband’s death, 
something quite common in contemporary American marriages.  By rejecting the mahr contract 
through the Establishment Clause, the court did something even more surprising.  The court’s 
opinion states that “the court is hopeful [Alwattar] will be able to enforce the provision and obtain 
relief through other religious means.”101  The court continues by giving an example of how 
Alwattar could obtain her relief: “the husband could be jailed in Syria if he has not paid the 
dowry.”102  It is difficult to imagine how this could be a suitable means for Alwattar’s relief.  The 
marriage took place in Ohio, between two Ohio residents who were presumably American 
nationals.  Syria has no jurisdiction over an American couple (even if they were Syrian citizens) 
for a crime under Syrian law that took place on American soil.  Moreover, Syria is not an enforcer 
of “Islamic” law wherever one finds it.  Is the court suggesting that only “Islamic” countries can 
enforce “Islamic” law?  Is an agreement between Muslims automatically “Islamic” by nature of 
the religious identity of the parties, although an agreement on the same terms between two 
Christian parties constitutes a “secular” agreement?  Is it possible that the two Muslim parties had 
“secular” intent when discussing the terms of a fiscal agreement?  Ultimately, the Zawahiri 
decision leaves more questions than answers regarding how American courts should rule when 
self-identified religious parties enter into agreements with each other. 
B. Aleem v. Aleem103 
After many years of marriage, Farah Aleem filed for divorce from her husband, Irfan 
Aleem, in a Maryland court.104  While the American action was still pending, Irfan went to the 
Pakistan Embassy in Washington, D.C. to obtain a Pakistani divorce, known as talaq.105  The 
Aleems, both Pakistani citizens, were married in Pakistan in 1980.106  The couple agreed on a 
postponed mahr of 51,000 rupees (about $2,500).107  The couple left Pakistan shortly after their 
wedding, moving to England for several years, before settling in Maryland, where Irfan worked at 
the World Bank.108 
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The Aleems lived a comfortable life in Maryland.  At the time of their divorce, the court 
estimated the value of their assets, including Irfan’s pension from the World Bank, their real 
property, and other personal items, at nearly two million dollars.109  Under Maryland law, a 
couple’s property “should be adjusted fairly and equitably” between the spouses.110  One can 
understand this to mean that Farah was entitled to a significant portion, if not one half, of the 
marital property, valued at just under two million dollars.  In the trial court, Irfan argued that since 
Irfan and Farah obtained a divorce under Pakistani law, the American court was excluded from 
litigating the division of property.111  Irfan supported his argument by pointing to a long-standing 
tradition of comity, under which American courts refrain from interfering in the decisions of 
foreign courts.112  According to Irfan, under Pakistani law, Farah would only be entitled to the 
mahr, as no other relevant provision for dividing the property belonging to a single spouse exists 
under the law.113  As a matter of diplomacy and international law, comity helps maintain good 
relations between sovereign nations.  However, when a foreign decision is contrary to the policy 
of American law, courts should not be bound by the domestic decision of a foreign tribunal.114 
The Maryland Court of Appeals correctly agreed with the trial court and the Court of 
Special Appeals that to award Farah the $2,500 stipulated in the mahr agreement, while her 
husband left the marriage with nearly two million dollars in assets acquired during the marriage, 
would be against the Maryland public policy of equitable and fair division of property.115  
However, the court spent much of its opinion mischaracterizing and misrepresenting “Islamic 
law” in order to reach that conclusion.  Islamic law is treated as a monolithic entity, established in 
the Qur’an and wholeheartedly adopted by some countries.  The court fails to distinguish between 
different schools of Islamic legal thought or identify variations among countries that have 
adopted, in part or in whole, an Islamic legal code. 
This misrepresentation is evident from the first pages of the decision, where the court 
tries to explain the meaning of talaq: “Apparently, under Islamic law, where that Islamic law has 
been adopted as the secular law of a jurisdiction, such as Pakistan, a husband has a virtual 
automatic right to talaq . . . .”116  According to the court, not only is there a singular entity known 
as “Islamic law,” but Pakistan adopted it into its secular code.  The court continues, trying to 
explain the limited nature of its decision: “Our holding in this case relates to . . . Islamic law only 
to the extent it is also the civil law of a country.  The viability of Islamic law as a religious canon 
is not intended to be affected.”117  There is no need for this caveat.  “Islamic law,” to the extent 
that any such law is definable, plays no real role in this case. Pakistani law is at issue, regardless 
of whether such law should be characterized as “religious,” “secular,” or “civil.”  By labeling the 
issue as one under “Islamic law [that] has been adopted as the secular law of a jurisdiction,”118 the 
court is overreaching beyond the laws of Pakistan and implying that the judgment of any Muslim 
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country that has incorporated Islamic teaching into its civil code could be ignored as a matter of 
public policy based on this decision.  The court seems blissfully unaware of the Christian-
normative basis for much of Anglo-American law, much less its potentially disparate effects on 
religious minorities. 
The court further misrepresents the purpose of the mahr.  Clearly, in this case, there is a 
huge gap between the value of the mahr and the equitable distribution of the Aleem’s property.  
The court understands that “[t]his stark discrepancy highlights the difference in the public policies 
of this State and the public policies of Islamic law, in the form adopted as the civil, secular law of 
countries such as Pakistan.”119  Like the asylum claims examined earlier, the court assumes that 
women are subjugated automatically under Islam.  The tone of the opinion suggests that the court 
is horrified at the gross inequity Irfan proposes and the court attributes this inequity to Islamic 
law.  Quite to the contrary, mahr is a means of guaranteeing a woman financial insurance in the 
event of divorce or death.  Because there is an underlying assumption that Islam is “bad” for 
women, the court interprets mahr as a means of belittling women and subjugating their socio-
economic positions.  However, one does not have to look far to see how the mahr provides much 
more generous compensation to the wife than other contemporary American laws.  In Zawahiri, 
the couple was young and only married for a short period of time.  Because they had not 
accumulated any significant property, the mahr was the only valuable property at issue in the 
case.  Alwattar was left empty-handed when the American court refused to recognize her mahr as 
a valid prenuptial contract. 
Although some jurisdictions have begun to recognize the validity of mahr, many courts 
still seem hesitant to enforce any agreement that appears Islamic in nature.  Whereas the Supreme 
Court of the United States has considered “morality,” when it reflects perceived Christian 
majority values, a valid basis for enforcing public policy,120 the same is apparently not the case 
when the values are perceived as Islamic.  Assumptions that Islam oppresses women color the 
judgments of judges who understand the motivation behind Muslim tradition more through 
prejudice and misconceptions than through an understanding of intellectual history or religious 
philosophy. 
IV. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND NATIONAL SECURITY: THE HIJAB AND 
IDENTIFICATION 
One of the most visible and prevalent issues Muslims face is the personal use and public 
restriction of religious headdress.  No prototypical Islamic head covering exists.  Both men and 
women cover their heads in ways that could be classified as “Islamic,” depending on one’s 
cultural tradition and particular religious beliefs.  However, the hijab is the article of clothing that 
seems to get the most press.  The word hijab, meaning literally a curtain or a veil, is used only a 
few times in the Qur’an and the Hadith, in passages about the Prophet Mohammed drawing a 
curtain between his wife and other men.121  The word has many rich and varied meanings in 
Islamic thought, from the veil literally worn over one’s head or face to a mystical separation 
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between Man and Truth.122  In contemporary usage, hijab can refer to the institution of veiling 
itself.123  It is also commonly used to refer to a specific covering worn by some Muslim women 
who cover their hair, necks, arms, and legs entirely, but leave their faces, hands, and feet bare in 
public.  Other covering Muslim women wear are also sometimes labeled hijab or other names 
particular to a specific region or ethnic group (such as niqab, burka, or chador).124  This covering 
ranges from loosely wearing a scarf over one’s hair to covering the body from head to toe, 
including the eyes.  Islamic scholars have argued for centuries about the necessity of female 
veiling (as well as male and female modesty in general) and there is no consensus regarding to 
what extent one should veil, if at all.125 
Nevertheless, many Muslim women feel it is their religious duty to remain covered in 
public.  It is as sacred to them as communion is to some Christians or donning a yarmulke is to 
some Jewish men.  This has not prevented secular states from enforcing restrictions on veiling.  
The most notorious modern example, of course, is France’s ban on “‘conspicuous’ religious 
symbols” in schools, which was passed in 2004.126  Furthermore, limits on Islamic dress are not 
confined to non-Muslim countries.  The Shah’s henchmen were infamous for carrying scissors to 
slice open the chadors of women caught wearing the traditional dress on the street in pre-1979 
Iran.127  A lively debate has also existed in Turkey since Attaturk’s rule regarding whether or not 
to lift the ban on veils in civic spaces.128  As many governments react to acts of terrorism, they 
often couch the debate surrounding veiling between religious freedom and national security. 
A. Freeman v. Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles129 
Sultaana Lakiana Myke Freeman converted to Islam in 1997 at the age of thirty.130  
Shortly thereafter, she began regularly wearing a veil, which covered her hair and face.131  While 
a resident of Illinois, Freeman had been photographed for her driver’s license wearing her veil.132  
She later moved to Florida, where she presented herself for a state driver’s license in February 
2001, wearing the hijab.133  The clerk who took Freeman’s photograph hesitated to do so while 
her face was covered, but he eventually received permission to take the photograph in spite of 
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Freeman’s “headgear,” which he did.134 
Several months after September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon, Freeman received a letter from the Department of Motor Vehicles, informing her that 
she must present herself for a photograph without her veil, or her license would be canceled.135  
After Freeman refused to be photographed without her veil, the state canceled her license and she 
appealed.136 
Both sides presented experts who testified to the necessity of veiling for Muslims.137  
The sides only disagreed over the possibility of making exceptions to the general rule.138  In the 
absence of differing opinion, the court had no choice but to accept the argument that Islam 
dictates veiling.  While the trial and appellate courts recognized some debate within the Islamic 
community regarding the enforcement of veiling and its potential exceptions, this debate is 
limited to those who believe, first of all, that Muslim women must veil as a tenet of their faith. 
In deciding whether the requirement to remove Freeman’s veil for an identification 
photograph violated her right to religious freedom, the court relied on an earlier Florida case, 
Warner v. City of Boca Raton,139 which interpreted the breadth of the Florida Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (“FRFRA”).  FRFRA forbids the state from substantially burdening one’s 
exercise of religion unless the state shows the burden: “(a) is in furtherance of a compelling 
government interest; and (b) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
government interest.”140  However, while the main issue in Warner was whether the plaintiffs 
held genuine religious beliefs, the Freeman court hardly addressed the issue.141  To the appellate 
court, Freeman truly believed that she must veil, affirming the trial judge’s conclusion.142  Even 
though the court accepted Freeman’s practice as a central tenet of her faith, it still determined that 
her exercise of that faith was not substantially burdened by the government’s insistence that she 
act directly contrarily to her beliefs.  One wonders to what extent latent fears about Muslims 
influenced the court’s decision. 
The trial judge made pains in his opinion to point out that Freeman was not “being 
singled out because she is a Muslim.”143  Moreover, the court was sure to note that Freeman 
herself is not a terrorist.  Nonetheless, the justification for denying Freeman her right to exercise 
her religion suggests a connection between Islam and terrorism: while “the Court acknowledges 
that Plaintiff herself most likely poses no threat to national security, there likely are people who 
would be willing to use a ruling permitting the wearing of fullface cloaks in driver’s license 
photos by pretending to ascribe to religious beliefs in order to carry out activities that would 
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threaten lives.”144  The reader immediately understands what these hypothetical threats are: 
Islamic terrorists literally hiding behind the veil of protected religion.  As Kathleen Moore notes 
in her analysis of Freeman, “[t]he upshot of the court’s ruling is that a Muslim woman who was 
not suspected of any crime was associated with the threat of terrorism merely on the basis of her 
appearance.”145  In a trial that ultimately had no relation to “radical Islam” or terrorism, the court 
reiterated the underlying fear that many Americans have about Muslims: that their very presence 
is a threat to “our” way of life and they will stop at nothing to destroy our freedoms. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Stereotypes about Muslims and fears of Islamic terrorism permeate the opinions of U.S. 
courts in many facets of the law.  These stereotypes evidently reflect widely-held biases in 
American society.  Akram’s neo-Orientalism is not limited to asylum cases, but can be identified 
in criminal, family, and civil rights cases as well.  Although a watershed event in so many other 
areas of American life, September 11 did not seem to significantly change the ways in which 
American courts approach Muslim parties.  However, as the Muslim population grows and 
becomes increasingly willing to avail American courts, negative stereotypes about Islam will 
affect many more parties in the legal system, potentially ostracizing the community.  Advocates 
for Muslim clients should be aware that judges and juries are not immune from social biases and 
should attempt to fashion their arguments in ways that do not prey on underlying anti-Islamic 
sentiments. 
American Muslims face a society that, despite its overtones of multi-culturalism and 
tolerance, has identified Islam as the enemy. According to American courts, Islamic culture is 
violent, irrational, and opposed to liberal values.  Consequently, Americans do not need to 
tolerate, much less encourage, this type of culture because it threatens the foundation of American 
secularism.  Although courts are a reflection of society, they also have the incredible potential to 
dictate the parameters of social debate.  If, through effective advocacy, courts begin to recognize 
Muslims as the diverse group that they are, then perhaps the rest of society will follow. 
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